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Susan Wachter, PhD, and Patricia A. McCoy, JD

Nearly eight years after their conservatorship was first announced, the GSEs
remain in the same “temporary” arrangement that was put into place to calm
the storms of the housing and financial crises of 2007 and 2008.
Namely, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to be
controlled by the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) under the dictates of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.1
Two years ago there appeared to be substantial
forward movement in the prospects for long-term
housing finance reform. Bipartisan legislation was put
forth, the Johnson-Crapo bill,2 which had considerable support. In any event, the proposed legislation did
not come to a floor vote. Despite this lack of resolution, leading industry groups and the Obama administration are once again calling for Congress to put into
place comprehensive reform.3
Impeding comprehensive reform are not just differences about the goals of housing finance reform but
also differences in the technical understanding of how
the secondary markets need to be structured in order
to accomplish the goals of a sustainable, efficient and
equitable housing finance system. Nonetheless, there
is consensus on a number of points important for the
structuring of the housing finance system. An Issue
Brief put forth last year by the Penn Wharton Public
Policy Initiative showcased these points of consensus.4
Beyond the continued calls for congressional

SUMMARY
• In the wake of the stalled Johnson-Crapo bill, the overarching
goal of housing finance reform continues to be the efficient
provision of long-term fixed-rate mortgages to credit-worthy
borrowers in all markets throughout the business cycle.
• This Issue Brief analyzes three newly-proposed plans for reforming the U.S. housing finance system: (1) a proposal from Jim
Parrot et al. to merge Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into a new
government corporation; (2) Andrew Davidson’s proposal for
mutual ownership of the GSEs by mortgage originators; and (3) an
opposing plan from Mark Calabria, arguing against securitization
altogether and for a return to the regime of originate-and-hold.
• Despite differences regarding implementation and governance
philosophy, a new consensus may be emerging for reform,
demonstrated most clearly in the first two proposals evaluated
here, which recognize the efficiency of centralizing and concentrating control of the housing finance system’s infrastructure
and credit risk.
• Despite the important points of consensus, the new proposals
still leave certain issues unresolved, including the potential
for cyclicality. Still, broad support for centralized functions
(i.e., promoting standardization, liquidity, consumer protection,
and access to credit), as well as the organic growth of credit
risk transfer transactions in recent years, may be important to
reigniting the push for resolution of GSE conservatorship.
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action, there now appears to be new
thinking on how the secondary market needs to be structured for
housing finance reform. Strikingly,
this new thinking may herald coalescence in the housing reform debate.
The Urban Institute has called for and
received a number of contributions
on rethinking the necessary components of reform.5 This Issue Brief is
informed by a research symposium,
jointly sponsored by the Penn
Wharton Public Policy Initiative
and the Penn Institute for Urban
Research, held in Washington, D.C.,
on June 15, 2016, for presenting and
discussing several of these proposals.
This Issue Brief analyzes the
potential merits and shortcomings
of three of the new proposed plans
seeking to restart the conversation
on reforming the country’s housing
finance system. In addition to the proposals discussed below, this Issue Brief
also includes a discussion of the new
points of consensus in the debate over
securitization reform, commentary on
alternative solutions, and a discourse
on unresolved issues and persistent
unknowns. Ultimately, there is reason
for optimism that the new proposals
discussed here are laying the foundations for bringing GSEs out of the
limbo of the last decade.

THE PRIOR CONSENSUS FOR
SECURITIZATION REFORM

of a new consensus. This new consensus, at least as demonstrated most
clearly in the two main proposals we
focus on here, involves a recognition
of the efficiency of centralizing and
concentrating control of the system’s
infrastructure and credit risk. The state
of the debate as Johnson-Crapo was
being considered included critical differences in opinion on the efficacy of
the very structure of the entities that
Johnson-Crapo put forward to take
over the role of the GSEs. Specifically,
Johnson-Crapo proposed distributing the GSE functions among many
actors and multiple firms in order to
deliver a competitive industry.
The new proposals appear to offer
additional points of consensus on the
distribution of GSE functions among
actors and firms. This move may
represent an important transformation, as it involves a new consensus
on an issue that had been a critical
point of disagreement. In short, most
of the new proposals clearly identify
the infrastructure role of the GSEs
as a necessarily centralized function.
The platform concept was put forth
in several of the previous proposals,
including the Hensarling bill6 and
Johnson-Crapo, but in these new proposals the concept is recognized as in
fact the central function of the hous-

Last year’s Issue Brief laid out four
points of consensus included in most
reform packages and specifically
embodied in Johnson-Crapo.
Those were:
• Preservation of the to-beannounced (TBA) market for
trading mortgage-backed securities (MBS), given the ongoing
political reality of long-term
fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S.;
• Private capital in a first-loss position to absorb downturns in the
MBS market, with a government
guarantee as a backstop to insure
against catastrophic outcomes,
paid for by borrowers through
guarantee fees, or g-fees;
• Creation of a common securitization platform (CSP) to provide
enhanced transparency, liquidity,
and oversight of credit standards;
• Specific plans for addressing
affordable housing goals.
New proposals go further, taking
on key points that previously were
sources of contention and ultimately led to the stalling of GSE
legislation in the last go-around,
and arguably, moving the dialogue
forward, to at least the beginnings

NOTES
Prepared Remarks of Melvin L. Watt, Director of FHFA, at the
Bipartisan Policy Center, February 18, 2016.
2 Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of
2014, S. 2017, 133th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 Trey Garrison, “Stegman: White House will not consider recap and release of GSEs,” Housing Wire, October 19, 2015;
Ben Lane, “Mortgage bankers, Realtors, home builders to
FHFA: Let Congress handle GSE reform,” Housing Wire, June
8, 2016.
4 Susan Wachter, “Next Steps in the Housing Finance Reform
1

Saga,” Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Brief, 3:2
(March 2015).
5 Proposals are available at http://www.urban.org/policycenters/housing-finance-policy-center/projects/housingfinance-reform-incubator. On the single-family market,
Moser is explicit in identifying the secondary function as a
natural monopoly. Other proposals range from suggesting
using the FHLBB as the base for a new secondary market
(Pollock) to adding two Newcos to the existing GSEs, while
allowing new entries into a heavily regulated market (Mill-

2

stein).
Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeownership Act of
2013, H.R. 2767, 113th Cong.
7 Parrott, Ranieri, Sperling, Zandi, and Zigas, “A More Promising Road to GSE Reform”, 2016.
8 Id.
9 Id.; “Must Government Remain a Backstop for Fannie and
Freddie?,” Knowledge@Wharton, May 24, 2016, http://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/160523_the_future_of_fanniemae_and_freddiemac-andrew-davidson/.
6
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ing finance securitizing entity. There is
recognition that this “platform” is not
efficiently provided by individual firms
but rather as a centralized infrastructure function.
By consolidating the purchasing, pooling, master servicing, and
risk control functions, ultimately the
centralized infrastructure function
enables and increases competition
where it should occur. An equally
important outcome is that interest
rate risk is separated from credit risk,
enabling the TBA market to exist and
credit risk to be centrally controlled.
The result of efficient provision of
centralized functions is more competition rather than less in the system as
a whole, although there are trade-offs.
In the words of one key new proposal
that advocates centralization:
We give up some competition
across these dimensions. How much
is difficult to tell, as regulators
would inevitably impose significant
limitations on the discretion that
they would allow private companies
providing these functions, given
the benefits of standardization and
the importance of managing risk
and consumer protection in the
system. However, they would no
doubt give private institutions at
least some discretion, which would

lead to differentiation and competition, resulting in a system that is
in some respects more nimble and
efficient than the one we propose,
with more innovation in developing
new mortgage products, servicing
loans, and sharing credit risk. As we
learned in the crisis, not all of that
competition and innovation would
be beneficial to consumers or the
stability of the market, but surely
much of it would.7
Nevertheless, the authors believe
that centralization is “worth the
trade-off ”:
By putting the key infrastructure
into a government corporation, we
level the playing field for lenders
of all sizes to compete rather than
become beholden to larger institutions that have gained an advantage
in times past by taking control over
access to the secondary market. Our
system also promotes competition
in the secondary market across a
wider range of sources of private
capital, including capital markets,
reinsurers, private mortgage insurers, lenders,and other private
entities. 8
The overarching goal of housing
finance reform for the bulk of the new
proposals continues to be the providing of long-term fixed-rate mortgages

A diverse group of housing finance
and policy experts—Jim Parrott,
Lewis Ranieri, Gene Sperling, Mark
Zandi, and Barry Zigas—have
proposed a new consensus-minded
system in which Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac would cease operating as
de facto public utilities under conservatorship and would merge into a
single entity.10 This entity would take
the form of a government corporation, which the authors have tentatively named the National Mortgage
Reinsurance Corporation (NMRC).
They argue that a government corporation has much of the flexibility

mortgages and exposes them only to interest rate and
prepayment risks, CAS and STACR remove that credit risk
from the GSEs and offer it to the private market as an
investment opportunity. The GSEs also have tested the appetites of private investors for credit risk through insurance/
reinsurance transactions, front-end lender risk sharing
transactions, and a senior subordinate security. Thus far, private investors, including asset managers, hedge funds, and
insurance companies (among others), have demonstrated
their capacity and willingness to invest in non-catastrophic

credit risk. In 2015, Fannie Mae transferred to them the risk
on $187 billion of collateral ($5.9 billion through CAS) and
Freddie Mac on $210 billion ($6.6 billion through STACR).
Both enterprises surpassed FHFA risk sharing requirements.
Today, the guarantee fees borrowers pay on GSE securitized
mortgages are set by the Federal Housing Finance Agency
and do not fluctuate with market conditions.
13 Davidson, “Four Steps Forward: Streamline, Share Risk,
Wrap, and Mutualize”, 2016.
14 Andrew Davidson & Co., “Simplifying GSE Reform: A Round-

to credit-worthy borrowers in all
markets throughout the business cycle
in the most efficient way possible.9
While the recognition of a need
for centralized secondary market
functions is core to two of the new
proposals we focus on here and
appears to be a part of many of the
new proposals, there are still many
deep differences in the options for
housing finance reform. These include
important issues of implementation
and governance philosophy that are in
contention, to which we turn below.

PROPOSAL 1: THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATION

NOTES
Parrott, Ranieri, Sperling, Zandi, and Zigas, “A More Promising Road to GSE Reform”, 2016.
11 All loans would have to meet the definition of a “qualified
mortgage” and be subject to FHFA price limits.
12 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have had success in recent
years with transferring mortgage credit risk to the private
market through structured debt issuance transactions
known as Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) and Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR), respectively. While
MBS protect investors against the credit risk of underlying
10

3

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

of a private entity without the rulemaking and compensation constraints
imposed by Congress on government
agencies. The NMRC would be a
closely regulated monopoly, charged
with “balanc[ing] broad access to
credit with the safety and soundness
of the mortgage market.” Although
the authors envision the NMRC as
free from the profit- or market sharedriven motives inherent in a stock
corporation and the unavoidable and
complex organizational challenges of a
mutual, they also contemplate private
investment in NMRC consisting of
common equity of 3.5% and preferred
equity of the same percentage.
The new entity would perform
the same core functions as the GSEs.
It would purchase conforming loans,
pool them, issue securities backed by
those loans through a CSP, provide
master servicing on the underlying
loans, ensure compliance with affordable housing goals and duty-to-serve
requirements (funded by a 10 bps
affordability fee), and maintain a
“cash window” to provide equal access
to liquidity to lenders of all sizes,
including community banks and other
small lenders.11 But there would be
important differences. The NMRC
would provide an explicit guarantee
on timely payment of principal and

interest of its MBS, backed by the full
faith and credit of the federal government and funded by a 10 bps g-fee.
It would also be required to transfer
all non-catastrophic credit risk to the
private market. The price of risk established through the trading of creditlinked notes and other credit risk
transfer mechanisms would be passed
on to mortgage borrowers and would
change with market conditions.12
Finally, NMRC would be prohibited from using its modest retained
portfolio for investment purposes. In
this proposal, the FHFA would continue to serve as the regulator for both
the NMRC and the Federal Home
Loan Banks (FHLBs). The FHFA
also would establish the g-fee for the
catastrophic risk and maintain a mortgage insurance fund (MIF) financed
by those g-fees, essentially acting as
a backstop for the housing finance
system similar to the FDIC’s role for
the banking system.
The proposal estimates that private
capital will cover the first 3.5% of
losses, with the MIF supplying an
additional 2.5% of first-loss coverage. This 6% capitalization is double
the realized GSE losses during the
housing crisis but less than the 10%
required under the Johnson-Crapo
Act. The proposal lists other benefits

NOTES
table Discussion,” 2015.
Calabria, “Coming Full Circle on Mortgage Finance,”2016.
16 This would require the controversial step, however, of extending the current risk retention requirements to qualified
mortgages.
17 Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. 2016. “Macroprudential Mortgage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” In
Principles of Housing Finance Reform, Susan M. Wachter
and Joseph Tracy, editors. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
15
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to a government corporation. The
NMRC would have the flexibility to
scale back risk transfers if an established crisis threshold was breached.
This threshold would act as an effective cap on g-fees and mortgage rates.
The improvements over the
Johnson-Crapo Act motivating this
proposal are appealing. Policymakers
will appreciate that mortgage rates,
under the assumptions laid out, are
no higher than in the current system,
although the rates would be more
procyclical. The transition from GSEs
to NMRC could be orderly, as it simply would accelerate what the FHFA
is currently doing. And, finally, the
government corporation could foster
coordination vis-à-vis loan limits and
priorities between itself and other
government housing agencies (the
FHA, the VA, and USDA), resulting
in a more unified federal approach
to housing.

PROPOSAL 2: THE MUTUAL
Andrew Davidson has put forward
another proposal for housing finance
reform.13 His proposal underscores
the degree of consensus by tracking Proposal 1 in important respects.
Like Parrott and his co-authors,
Davidson would centralize the buying
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and pooling of loans, the issuance of
MBS, and master servicing activities
in his new proposed entities. Building
off of the recent credit risk transfer
successes, Davidson’s proposal would
establish reinsurance and credit risksharing programs for up to 75% of
risk on new GSE loans, providing
first-loss coverage backed by highquality assets.14 There would also be
a government backstop in the form
of an explicit federal guarantee of the
entities’ MBS, which would be closely
regulated and akin to what Ginnie
Mae securities currently receive. This
guarantee would be funded by g-fees,
while affordable housing goals would
be funded by an affordability fee,
both intended to cushion any losses.
Finally, similar to Proposal 1, the new
entities’ retained portfolios would be
sharply reduced.
However, the governance structure differs. This proposal puts forth
mutual ownership of the GSEs by
mortgage originators as an alternative
to a government corporation. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac each would
be given the opportunity to convert
themselves into mutuals, funded by
mortgage activity and regulated by the
FHFA. Ideally, the mutual structure
would ensure that all profits would
be paid out to the mutual owners in
the form of dividends and that these
funds would be recycled directly
back into their mortgage businesses.
Davidson also differs somewhat with
Proposal 1 in that, while the national
duty-to serve responsibility is a federal mandate, it would be up to the
mutual to determine how to incent its
members to implement those responsibilities. The overall responsibility is
the same, but mutual members would

have greater say in how to implement
the national duty-to-serve responsibilities than they would with a government corporation.
A third major way in which the
Davidson proposal differs from Parrott et al. is by limiting the mutuals’
exposure for losses up to a vintage or
cohort limit, with the government
wrap covering any additional losses.
This would permit the mutuals to
survive a housing market collapse or
other market catastrophe. Further, in
distressed conditions where the availability of private capital is insufficient,
the Treasury would be allowed to
assume part of the credit risk for new
vintages (for an unappealingly high
but reasonable return).
Davidson also has thoughtful
proposals to ease the transition. If the
two new mutuals could not coexist
indefinitely, eventually merging into a
single mutual sometime in the future
(as this plan effectively bolsters a
natural monopoly), that combination
is not necessary immediately in order
for Congress to move Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac out of conservatorship. A CSP, though desirable, also is
not mandatory at first, especially if it
would be too costly to implement or if
it would slow down the transition.
The FHFA can undertake further
streamlining measures by itself. But
before Congress could authorize the
government wrap or the establishment
of a mutual structure for the GSEs, it
must first facilitate the expansion of
the risk sharing investor base in order
for this proposal to work. Here Davidson goes into more specific detail than
Proposal 1. As the Urban Institute
has noted, demand for structured debt
issuances is leveling off. Serious explo5

ration of credit-linked notes (CLNs)
and other reinsurance mechanisms
demands markets with sufficient
investors. Davidson recommends
several reforms, including changes to
IRS and SEC rules to allow REITs to
invest in GSE credit risk bonds. He
would also amend the bank capital treatment of credit risk transfer
transactions and CFTC rules limiting
the use of CLNs. In short, Davidson
writes, “Bonds created by the GSEs
under the regulatory oversight of the
FHFA should not be treated like the
subprime and [CDO] investments
that contributed to the crisis.” Davidson would go even further in reducing
taxpayer risk and the concentration of
credit risk in the economy by developing risk retention and up-front risk
sharing for originators on a pooled
or specific basis and by establishing capital rules for the mutuals that
encourage risk sharing while addressing counterparty risk.
While these proposals are similar
in foundational ways, the governance
set-ups differ. These differences may
not be as important as they seem
because Proposal 1 is flexible with the
potential of a utility structure or of a
mutual or in fact could have shareholders as well.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL:
ORIGINATE-AND-HOLD
Mark Calabria of the Cato Institute
offers a divergent, non-consensus
plan for reform.15 Arguing that the
most fundamental flaw of the housing finance system is investors’ lack
of knowledge or concern about the
underlying credit risk of MBS—eventually leading to a consolidation of

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

risk in the most leveraged sectors of
the financial system—he advocates
against securitization and for the
return to the regime of originate-andhold that prevailed prior to 1980.
Going forward, he proposes that
GSE charters be converted to national
bank charters, thus reorganizing the
GSEs as bank holding companies
(BHCs). The GSEs would continue to
pool and securitize mortgages, to the
extent the market supported this, but
without any government guarantees
(other than the guarantees through
deposit insurance that depositories
receive) but they also would be able to
originate, collect deposits, and engage
in other bank activities. Furthermore,
the addition of two large BHCs into
the financial system would increase
competition. An obvious downside
would be an exacerbation of the
TBTF problem, though Calabria does
call for greater BHC capital requirements. The other and salient downside
is, as Calabria acknowledges, that the
system likely would move towards
short-term mortgages, such as prevail
in Canada. The Calabria proposal is
instructive in that it clearly lays out
how the structure of the housing
finance system dictates what mortgages are likely to be offered.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND
PERSISTENT UNKNOWNS
In all three of the proposals, there
remains the potential for cyclicality,
both in terms of g-fees and mortgage rates themselves. For instance,
Parrott and his colleagues envision
a crisis scenario where private investors increase their required return
on equity from 10% to 25%, caus-

ing g-fees to rise by 53 bps. At that
point the federal government would
step in. An increase of this size likely
would cause lending to contract and
slow down the recovery. However, this
procyclicality could be mitigated by
counter-cyclical standards for capital
and provisioning as well as risk retention requirements,16 posing less of a
threat than the procyclicality inherent
in the Johnson-Crapo Act.
On the related subject of capital,
the government corporation proposal
terms its plan for total capitalization
of 6% as adequate, on grounds that
that level is approximately double
the losses realized by the GSEs due
to the crisis. However, the proposal
fails to respond to serious critiques
calling for higher private capitalization of 15% or more, as discussed in
the previous Issue Brief, which again
suggests that the proposal underestimates the potential for procyclicality.
It also should be noted that capital
requirements should be inverse to the
procyclicality of the system as a whole.
Thus, the importance of a system that
promotes stability. 17
Proposals 1 and 2 also tee up the
question of the proper choice of entity.
The mutual form is more conducive
to efficiency. Meanwhile, mutuals face
difficulties in raising capital and wellknown governance challenges that are
unique to the mutual form.
None of the proposals addresses
the possible re-emergence of a
private-label market for non-amortizing products and other nonqualified mortgages and the resulting
implications for moral hazard by the
successor(s) to the GSEs. If these
riskier loans gain headway, what
would stop the NMRC or a mutual
6

from loosening credit standards to
preserve market share (particularly if
leadership at FHFA was weak)? Even
without a response from the NMRC
or mutual, would this not destabilize
the system?
Similarly, all three proposals are
silent about the opportunity that GSE
reform affords to institute fundamental reforms of mortgage servicing
practices. Among those problems, servicer compensation and loss mitigation protocols need thorough revamping going forward.
Another unresolved issue in the
Davidson proposal concerns the
limiting of MBS losses by cohort or
vintage and whether such a feature is
necessary. Grouping MBS by vintage
theoretically confines losses to one
year’s book of business, but it cannot
perfectly insulate lenders from serial
correlation and the practical creeping
of losses across years. This brings to
the fore the greatest unknown for the
NMRC and mutual proposals: what
if the federal government does need
to intervene in the housing system
again?
For example, if investors suddenly
flee the credit risk transfer market
and a GSE successor experiences a
run and requires a bail out, what are
the implications, both from a political
standpoint and in terms of moral hazard? Could the flight from securitization markets in 1998 and 2007-2008
occur again? These questions warrant consideration, particularly given
the perverse incentives toward even
greater risk-taking going forward.
A final unknown that needs to
be carefully addressed is whether the
estimates in Proposal 1 regarding
capitalization and the NMRC’s ability
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to raise sufficient private capital to
cushion losses and avoid procyclicality
are sufficient or too low, and whether
raising the necessary funds is feasible.

CONCLUSION
With each passing year, the “temporary” conservatorship of the GSEs
becomes more and more untenable.

Fortunately, over time, there appears
to be more agreement among proposals than is currently recognized,
and increased coalescence around a
path forward in the debate over GSE
reform, despite several points that still
require reconciliation. Broad agreement over the need for centralized
functions—promoting standardization, liquidity, consumer protection,

7

and access to credit—and the organic
growth of credit risk transfer transactions in recent years, may be enough
to reignite the conversation and lead
to a resolution of the convervatorship,
which is needed for the long-term
stability of the U.S. housing finance
system.
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